Data on …nancial intermediation value added share in GDP are from Smits, Woltjer, and Ma (2009).
A Historic …nance income share
Data on …nancial intermediation value added share in GDP are from Smits, Woltjer, and Ma (2009) . The sample is Belgium (BEL) 1835 -1990 1850 -1958 1860 -1969 1861 -1913 , and the United Kingdom (UK) (no data for the U. K. in 1914-1919 and 1939-1945) . For all countries but the U.K. the data are nominal, so we simply divide …nancial intermediation value added by GDP to get the share. For the U.K. the data are volume indices.
Various other historical statistical sources used are: Australia in 1861-1939 from Vamplew (1987) ; Canada in 1870-1926 from Urquhart (1993 Urquhart ( ) and in 1926 Urquhart ( -1976 
U.K. …nance income share in 1855-1965
The raw historic value added and GDP series for the U.K. in Smits, Woltjer, and Ma (2009) are volume indices (equal to 100 in 1913) . To get the value added share in the U.K. we assume that the real unit cost of …nancial services, denominated in units of GDP (i.e. the nominal unit cost of …nancial services divided by the unit cost of GDP, or the GDP de ‡ator) is constant from 1970 going backwards. This is consistent with Philippon (2012) : the real unit cost of …nancial intermediation in the U.S. is relatively stable until the 1980s, and does not exhibit a trend. Essentially, we assume that the same holds for the U.K.
We divide the value added share of …nance from the EU KLEMS series in 1970 (the …rst year in that data for the U.K.)
EU KLEM S by the ratio of quantity indices in 1965 (the last year in the historic series for the U.K.) v f in =v GDP to get
We then use to compute the historic for 1855-1965:
The source data for the U.K. in Smits, Woltjer, and Ma (2009) comes from Feinstein (1972) , which also has data on employment in …nance and overall employment in 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1920-1938 and 1948-1965 . We compare the historic t value added share series to the employment share of …nance computed from Feinstein (1972) : both share a common trend. The historic t series is larger than the employment share (implying that value added per worker is higher in …nance than on average). The ratio of the two series (equivalent to value added per worker in …nance divided by GDP per worker) exhibits some variation: It is 1.66 in 1861, on average 3.5 in 1871-1911, and then continuously decreases from 2.37 in 1920 to 1.6 in 1965.
B Financial deregulation index
We use data from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008) to construct an index of …nancial deregulation. The index is constructed by combining seven dimensions of reform.
1. Credit controls: capture restrictions on the amounts of bank lending to speci…c sectors or ceiling on overall credit extended by banks.
2. Interest rate controls: capture the degree to which banks are restricted in setting rates (whether ‡oor or ceiling interest rates exist and/or bind).
3. Entry barriers: capture barriers to entry into the …nancial system which may take the form of restrictions on the participation of foreign banks; restrictions on the scope of banks'activities; restrictions on the geographic area where banks can operate; or excessively restrictive licensing requirements.
4. Privatization: captures the degree to which the government is not involved directly in …nancial services (using thresholds of 50 percent, 25 percent and 10 percent of state ownership to di¤erentiate between full state control and full liberalization, respectively).
5. Capital account restrictions: capture having multiple exchange rates for various transactions, as well as transactions taxes or outright restrictions on in ‡ows and/or out ‡ows.
6. Securities market development captures policies that governments use to encourage development of securities markets; these include auctioning of government securities, establishment of debt and equity markets and policies to encourage development of these markets (such as tax incentives or development of depository and settlement systems), and policies to promote the openness of securities markets to foreign investors.
7. Prudential regulation and supervision: captures whether a country adopted risk-based capital adequacy ratios based on the Basel I capital accord, and whether the banking supervisory agency is independent from the executive's in ‡uence and has su¢ cient legal power.
Each index originally ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates the most restrictive regulations, except in 7, where 3 indicates the most restrictive regulation. The deregulation index is the sum of indices 1 to 6 minus index 7.
